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Systems Analysis Symposium. The goal of the battle was to compare the performance of8
algorithms for the detection of cyber-physical attacks, whose frequency increased in the past9
few years along with the adoption of smart water technologies. The design challenge was set10
for C-Town network, a real-world, medium-sized water distribution system operated through11
Programmable Logic Controllers and a Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)12
system. Participants were provided with datasets containing (simulated) SCADA observa-13
tions, and challenged with the design of an attack detection algorithm. The effectiveness of14
all submitted algorithms was evaluated in terms of time-to-detection and classification accu-15
racy. Seven teams participated in the battle and proposed a variety of successful approaches16
leveraging data analysis, model-based detection mechanisms, and rule checking. Results were17
presented at the Water Distribution Systems Analysis Symposium (World Environmental &18
Water Resources Congress), in Sacramento, on May 21-25, 2017. This paper summarizes the19
BATADAL problem, proposed algorithms, results, and future research directions.20
Keywords: Water distribution systems, Cyber-physical attacks, Cyber security, EPANET,21
Smart water networks, Attack detection22
INTRODUCTION23
The past decades witnessed the transition of water distribution systems from traditional24
physical infrastructures to cyber-physical systems that combine physical processes with com-25
putation and networking: physical assets—such as pipes, pumps, and valves—work in unison26
with networked devices that monitor and coordinate the operations of the entire system.27
These devices include Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), Supervisory Control And28
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), static and mobile29
sensor networks, and smart meters (Hill et al. 2014; Gong et al. 2016; Sønderlund et al.30
2016). The adoption of such smart water technologies plays a pivotal role in enhancing the31
automation and reliability of water distribution systems, but simultaneously exposes them32
to cyber-physical attacks (Rasekh et al. 2016)—namely the deliberate exploitation of com-33
puter systems aimed at accessing sensitive information or compromising the operations of34
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the underlying physical system. Water (and wastewater) systems represent one of the sixteen35
critical infrastructure sectors identified by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (U.S.36
Department of Homeland Security 2017), according to which the number of reported attacks37
on water infrastructures has been growing steadily (ICS-CERT 2014; ICS-CERT 2015; ICS-38
CERT 2016)—making them the third highest targeted sector after critical manufacturing39
and energy (ICS-CERT 2016). To take remedial actions, several countries are establishing40
research centres and international collaborations, such as the Israel–New York collaboration41
to defend water systems from "infrastructure terrorists" (The Times of Israel 2018).42
43
Protecting water distribution systems from cyber attacks requires (as with other cyber-44
physical systems) a combination of proactive and reactive mechanisms (Cardenas et al. 2008).45
Proactive mechanisms comprise all tools that reduce the chances to penetrate the system,46
such as appropriate measures for traffic authentication and confidentiality protection, access47
control, and device hardening (Graham et al. 2016; Adepu et al. 2017). Since it is not pos-48
sible to rule out all attacks, cyber-physical systems should also be equipped with intrusion49
detection schemes that assist with the recovery phase (Anderson 2010). Disclosing cyber50
attacks—without issuing false alarms—is thus crucial. Unfortunately, this does not come51
without some system-specific challenges. First, the definition of anomalous behaviours should52
not only be related to point, or content, anomalies—i.e., data points lying beyond some53
specific thresholds—since cyber-physical attacks can tamper one or multiple network com-54
ponents while keeping the performance characteristics within the historical bounds (Abokifa55
et al. 2017). This implies that detection schemes should be capable of disclosing both content56
and contextual anomalies, namely, data points that are considered abnormal when viewed57
against meta-information associated with the data points (Hayes and Capretz 2015). For58
example, unaccounted high volumes of water leaving tanks during nighttime, when demand59
is generally low, may be seen as a contextual anomaly revealed by looking at the flow data in60
the context of time. Second, the same hydraulic response of a water network (e.g., low water61
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levels in a tank) can be obtained through different attacks (Taormina et al. 2017). There-62
fore, detection schemes should also identify the cyber components that have been attacked;63
a non-negligible challenge in large water networks. Third, all networked devices, including64
SCADA systems, represent potential targets. This means that the information provided by65
SCADA systems may not be fully reliable.66
67
As the field of intrusion detection continues to grow, so too does the need of an objective68
comparison of attack detection algorithms for water distribution systems. The BATtle of69
the Attack Detection ALgorithms (BATADAL) was oragnized for this purpose. Participants70
were provided with datasets containing (simulated) SCADA data for a water distribution71
system victim of cyber attacks, and were tasked with the design of an attack detection72
mechanism. The design goals of a detection algorithm were to: (1) disclose the presence73
of an ongoing attack in the minimum time possible, (2) avoid issuing false alarms, and (3)74
identify which components of the system have been compromised (optional). Seven teams,75
from both academia and industry, contributed with novel solutions, which were evaluated76
using specific evaluation criteria—i.e., time-to-detection and classification accuracy. The77
BATADAL results were presented at a special session of the Water Distribution Systems78
Analysis Symposium (World Environmental & Water resources Congress), in Sacramento,79
on May 21-25, 2017.80
81
This paper summarizes the main solutions and outcomes of the BATADAL, and proposes82
future research directions for event detection in the realm of cyber-physical security. The83
remainder of the paper describes: (1) the BATADAL problem, data, and evaluation criteria;84
(2) a synopsis of the proposed attack detection algorithms; (3) an analysis of the results;85
and (4) conclusions and future research directions.86
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION87
The operators of C-Town water distribution system have observed anomalous behaviors88
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in some hydraulic components, e.g., tank overflows, reduction in pump speed, anomalous89
activation/deactivation of pumps. They suspect that the anomalies are attributable to cyber-90
physical attacks that interfered with the system operations and tampered with the readings91
recorded by the SCADA system. The aim of the participants was to develop an attack92
detection mechanism that detects the presence of attacks—in the shortest amount of time—93
from the available hourly SCADA data. In particular, attack detection algorithms must94
classify the system state as either ‘safe’ or ‘under attack’. A summary description of C-Town95
is provided below, along with the development data and evaluation criteria. BATADAL rules,96
problem details, and data are available in the supplemental material of the paper.97
C-Town Network98
C-Town water distribution system is based on a real-world, medium-sized network, first99
introduced for the Battle of the Water Calibration Network (Ostfeld et al. 2011). The network100
consists of 429 pipes, 388 junctions, 7 storage tanks, 11 pumps (distributed across 5 pumping101
stations), 5 valves, and a single reservoir (see Figure 1). Water consumption is fairly regular102
throughout the year. These physical assets were augmented with a network of nine PLCs,103
which are located in proximity of pumps, storage tanks, and valves. As shown in Table 1,104
most of the PLCs controlling the pumps receive the information needed by the control logic105
from other PLCs—for instance, PLC1 controls pump PU1 and PU2 on the basis of tank106
T1 water level, which is monitored by PLC2. PLCs controlling pumps and valves record107
information on the device status (ON/OFF or OPEN/CLOSED), the flow passing through108
it, and the inlet and outlet pressure of pumping stations. The cyber network includes a109
SCADA system, whose role is to coordinate the operations and store the readings provided110
by the PLCs. All information regarding the distribution system were incorporated into the111
EPANET2 (Rossman 2000) input file C-Town.inp, which was provided to the participants.112
Water demand in all nodes of C-Town was not shared, meaning that participants could not113
run the model for the same period and then compare the results with the provided SCADA114
data.115
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Development data116
Participants were provided with three datasets containing SCADA readings for 43 sys-117
tem variables, i.e., tank water levels (7 variables, denoted as L_<tank id>), inlet and118
outlet pressure for one actuated valve and all pumping stations (12 variables, denoted as119
P_<junction id>), as well as their flow and status (24 variables, denoted as F_<actuator120
id> and S_<actuator id>, respectively). All variables are continuous, with the excep-121
tion of the status of valve and pumps, represented by binary variables. The datasets were122
generated via simulation with epanetCPA, a Matlab toolbox that allows to design a va-123
riety of cyber attacks and simulate, with EPANET2 (version 2.0.12), the hydraulic re-124
sponse of a water distribution network (Taormina et al. 2017). The toolbox is available125
at https://github.com/rtaormina/epanetCPA. The hydraulic time step was set to 15126
minutes, while the SCADA data reported to the participants were sampled with fixed hourly127
intervals. The first two datasets, hereafter named Training dataset 1 and Training dataset128
2, were provided at the beginning of the competition, while the third one (Test dataset) was129
subsequently used to evaluate and rank the attack detection algorithms.130
• Training dataset 1 was generated with a simulation horizon of 365 days. A key aspect131
of the dataset is the absence of cyber attacks, which made it suitable for studying the132
operations of the water distribution system under normal operating conditions.133
• Training dataset 2 contains seven attacks, spanning over 492 hourly time steps. One134
attack was entirely revealed to the participants (by appropriately labelling the cor-135
responding time steps), while the remaining attacks were either partially revealed or136
hidden; see Table 2 for additional details. This corresponds to a post-attack scenario,137
in which forensics experts carry out an investigation to determine whether, when, and138
where the water distribution system has been affected.139
• Test dataset contains seven additional attacks, spanning over 407 hourly time steps140
(see Table 3). Naturally, no information regarding the attacks was revealed. Partici-141
pants were required to run the detection algorithms on the Test dataset and to submit142
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a detection report containing the following information: number of attacks detected,143
start and end time of each attack (in DD-MM-YYYY hh format), and the label of144
the attacked device(s) (optional).145
The operations of the water system were altered through malicious activation of hydraulic146
actuators, change of actuator settings, and deception attacks—amongst the most common147
for cyber-physical systems (Cardenas et al. 2009). The latter were aimed at manipulating148
the information sent or received by sensors and PLCs, with the ultimate goal of affecting the149
operations of an actuator (Urbina et al. 2016). Note that deception attacks were also used to150
alter the information received by SCADA, therefore concealing the real, physical outcomes151
of the attacks. SCADA concealment was performed by either adding an offset to the trans-152
mitted sensor readings or by replacing actual traffic information between PLCs and SCADA153
with previously-recorded data, a type of manipulation known as replay attack (Urbina et al.154
2016). The replay attacks featured in the BATADAL consisted in replacing data for a given155
hour of the day with those recorded during the same hour one or two days before. Figure 2156
illustrates attack #3 (Training dataset 2), where both pump operations and SCADA data157
are compromised. In this case, a deception attack manipulates Tank T1 water level readings158
sent by PLC2 to PLC1. PLC1 receives a reading equal to 0.5 meters, which is below the159
low level thresholds that activate pumps PU1 and PU2 (4 and 1 meter, respectively). This160
results in both pumps working for the entire period of the attack, which lasts for 60 hours.161
Consequently, the water level in Tank T1 reaches the full tank level (6.5 meters), with the162
excess water being spilled. The adversary tries to conceal the surge in T1 water level with a163
second deception attack that alters the signal sent by PLC2 to SCADA with a time-varying164
offset.165
Evaluation criteria166
The attack detection algorithms were evaluated by comparing the detection report submitted167
by each team against the provided Test dataset. The assessment was based on two scores168
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that account for (1) the time taken to detect an attack, and (2) the classification accuracy.169
The two scores were eventually combined into an overall ranking score, as explained next.170
Time-to-detection171
The time-to-detection (TTD) is the time needed by an algorithm to disclose a threat. It is172
defined as the difference between the time td at which the attack is detected and the time t0173
at which the attack started:174
TTD = td − t0. (1)175
The value of td is inferred from the detection report, and it corresponds to the first time176
stamp flagged as ‘under attack’ while the attack is ongoing. The lower the value of TTD,177
the better the algorithm performs. If an attack is detected, we then have:178
0 ≤ TTD ≤ ∆t, (2)179
where ∆t is the total duration of the attack. If the attack is not detected while it is ongoing180
(or at all), we set TTD = ∆t. To facilitate the comparison of all algorithms under different181
attack scenarios, the following performance score (STTD) was computed:182
STTD = 1− 1
na
na∑
i
TTDi
∆ti
, (3)183
where na is the number of attacks contained in a dataset, TTDi the time-to-detection relative184
to the i -th attack, and ∆ti the corresponding duration. STTD varies between 0 and 1, with185
STTD = 1 being the ideal case in which all attacks are immediately detected, and STTD = 0186
the case in which none of the attacks is detected.187
Classification performance188
We determined the accuracy of an algorithm as its ability to disclose threats without raising189
false alarms. In the context of binary classification problems—like the BATADAL—the190
ability to identify threats is generally assessed with the True Positive Rate (TPR, also191
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known as recall or sensitivity), which is defined as:192
TPR =
TP
TP + FN
, (4)193
where TP and FN represent the number of True Positives and False Negatives, respectively.194
In other words, the True Positive Rate is the ratio between the number of time steps cor-195
rectly classified as under attack and the total number of time steps during which the system196
is under attack.197
198
The ability to avoid false alarms is measured with the True Negative Rate (TNR, or speci-199
ficity), defined as200
TNR =
TN
FP + TN
, (5)201
where FP and TN represent the number of False Positives and True Negatives, respectively.202
The True Negative Rate is thus the ratio between the number of time steps correctly classi-203
fied as safe conditions and the total number of time steps during which the system is in safe204
conditions.205
206
To ease the comparison across all algorithms, the True Positive and True Negative Rate were207
combined into a single classification performance score (SCLF ), defined as the mean between208
TPR and TNR, namely:209
SCLF =
TPR + TNR
2
. (6)210
This score accounts for both correct detection and false alarms, so it is suited for binary211
classification problems in which the sample distribution is biased towards one of the two212
classes—i.e., safe conditions, in the BATADAL. The value of SCLF varies between 0 and 1,213
with 1 representing a perfect classification.214
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Ranking score215
The time-to-detection and accuracy scores were finally merged into an overall ranking score216
(S), defined as:217
S = γ · STTD + (1− γ) · SCLF , (7)218
where γ (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) determines the relative importance of the two evaluation scores. The219
coefficient γ was set to 0.5 for the analysis reported below; so, early detection and accurate220
classification were equally weighed. Note that a naïve detection mechanism that predicts the221
system to be always in safe conditions gets a score S equal to 0.25 (STTD = 0, SCLF = 0.5).222
On the other hand, flagging the system as always under attack yields a value of S equal to223
0.75 (STTD = 1, SCLF = 0.5). This reflects the fact that S is intrinsically biased towards224
attack identification, since the the consequences of failing to disclose an attack are deemed225
more costly than issuing false alarms. These naïve detection methods have the same value226
of SCLF (equal to 0.5); yet, TPR and TNR are equal to 0 and 1 in the first case, and to227
1 and 0 in the second case. This highlights the contrasting nature of the two components228
of SCLF , and suggests how increased sensitivity may come at the cost of issuing more false229
alarms (and vice versa). Similarly, a potential conflict seems to exist between ensuring a230
timely detection of the attacks (high STTD) and issuing few false alarms, as recently pointed231
out by Housh and Ohar (2017c).232
ATTACK DETECTION ALGORITHMS233
Seven teams participated in the BATADAL. Here, we provide a brief description of each234
team’s attack detection algorithm.235
• Aghashahi et al. (2017) adopted a two-stage method that first extracts a four-236
dimensional feature vector from the observed (multi-dimensional) time series data,237
and then constructs a classifier to detect attacks. In the first stage, the time periods238
of attack/no attack were used to extract four features that captured information on239
the covariance and mean structure. Here, for every time instance, a local neighbor-240
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hood is utilized to construct estimates of mean and covariance. In the second stage, a241
supervised classification technique (i.e., Random Forests, Breiman (2001)) was used242
to classify the system state as safe or under attack.243
• Brentan et al. (2017) reduced the dimensionality of the problem by exploiting the244
division of C-Town network in District Metered Areas (DMAs). For each DMA, the245
authors used data on normal operating conditions to create Recurrent Neural Net-246
works that forecast tank water levels as a function of pump flow, upstream pressure247
(of the corresponding pump station), and hour of the day (Díaz et al. 2016). A statis-248
tical control process was finally used to identify abrupt changes in the neural networks249
error time series when the latter were applied to data containing cyber attacks (Gu-250
ralnik and Srivastava 1999). The rationale behind this approach is that it is plausible251
to expect an increase in the error time series when the system is under attack, since252
all neural networks are trained with data pertaining to normal operations.253
• Chandy et al. (2017) developed two detection models running sequentially. The first254
one uses features of the SCADA data (e.g., combined flow of pump stations, volume255
pumped and stored) to check whether physical and/or operating rules have been256
violated (e.g., tank levels within the bounds, hydraulic relationships between nodes257
hold). The outcome of this model is a set of flagged events, which are confirmed by the258
second model. The latter is a Convolutional Variational Auto-Encoder—belonging to259
the family of deep learning methods (Kingma and Welling 2013; Doersch 2016)—that260
calculates the reconstruction probability of the data: the lower the probability, the261
higher the chance of the data being anomalous.262
• Giacomoni et al. (2017) proposed two detection methods. The first one verifies the263
integrity of the actuator rules and SCADA data—by (1) checking whether the SCADA264
readings are consistent with the actuator rules defined for the water distribution265
system, and (2) comparing the data for all variables to identify values falling below266
or above thresholds created by analyzing data corresponding to normal operating267
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conditions. The second method builds on unveiling low-dimensionality components268
in the available data as well as the sparse nature of anomalies, thereby facilitating the269
separation of anomalies from the overall data. The separation of data into normal and270
anomalous components can be performed using prinicipal component analysis (PCA)271
(Lakhina et al. 2004) or a covex optimization routine (Mardani et al. 2013). (The272
results reported below for Giacomoni et al. (2017) correspond to the second detection273
method based on PCA.)274
• Abokifa et al. (2017) introduced a three-stage detection method, with each stage tar-275
geting a specific class of anomalies. The first step features outlier detection techniques276
to find statistical outliers in the data, thereby focusing on local anomalies that affect277
each sensor individually. The second stage employs an Artificial Neural Network—in278
the form of a Multi-Layer Perceptron—to detect contextual anomalies that do not279
conform to normal operating conditions. The third stage targets global anomalies280
that simultaneously affect multiple sensors. To disclose these anomalies, the layer281
uses Principal Component Analysis to decompose the high-dimensional datasets of282
sensor measurements into two sub-spaces representing normal and anomalous condi-283
tions (Lee et al. 2013).284
• Pasha et al. (2017) presented an algorithm consisting of three main interconnected285
modules working on control rules and consistency checks, pattern recognition, and286
hydraulic and system relationships. The first module checks the consistency of the287
data against the set of control rules characterizing the water system, while the second288
one uses statistical analysis to identify patterns for single hydraulic parameters and289
combination thereof. The idea is that patterns under cyber attacks may not follow the290
original ones. The anomalous behaviors detected by the first two modules are finally291
confirmed by the third one, which develops relationships for some physical quantities292
(e.g., tank levels, flows) and compares their estimates against those reported by the293
first two modules.294
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• Housh and Ohar (2017b) proposed a model-based approach that employs EPANET295
to simulate the hydraulic processes of the water distribution systems, and then uses296
the error between EPANET simulated values and the available SCADA readings to297
detect anomalous behaviors. The approach consists of three main steps: first, avail-298
able SCADA readings are used in a Mixed-Integer Linear Program to estimate the299
water demand in all nodes of C-Town; second, EPANET is used to generate reference300
values for the SCADA readings which are used to produce simulation errors when301
compared to actual readings; and third, a multi-level classification approach is imple-302
mented to classify the obtained simulation errors into event and normal conditions.303
A similar approach was successfully developed by Housh and Ohar (2017a) to detect304
contamination events in water distribution systems.305
RESULTS306
Algorithms performance307
Table 4 reports the values of the ranking, time-to-detection, and classification score (S,308
STTD, and SCLF ) obtained by the competing algorithms on the test dataset. The table also309
reports the number of attacks detected, the values of TPR and TNR yielding the classifica-310
tion score, and the elements of the confusion matrix (i.e., TP , FP , TN , and FN). A visual311
comparison of S, STTD, and SCLF is given in the scatter plot of Figure 3.312
313
Figure 3 highlights a cluster of four high-performing algorithms, all achieving a ranking314
score S higher than (or close to) 0.90. The group is led by the algorithm proposed by Housh315
and Ohar (2017b), which shows the best overall performance (S = 0.970). Note that this316
algorithm is the top scorer in terms of both time-to-detection STTD and classification score317
SCLF . Indeed, the detection trajectory depicted in Figure 4(a) shows that all attacks were318
immediately detected, with the exception of the last one, which was disclosed a few hours319
after its starting time. The algorithm of Abokifa et al. (2017) comes a close second, with S320
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equal to 0.949. This method was almost as quick as Housh and Ohar (2017b) in identifying321
the attacks, but it was more prone to false alarms. As shown in Figure 4(b), Abokifa et al.322
(2017) algorithm disclosed Attack #10 and #11 as a single continuous episode, erroneously323
flagging the system as under attack for the period in between. The algorithm proposed by Gi-324
acomoni et al. (2017) has the same TNR as that of Housh and Ohar (2017b)—meaning that325
both algorithms were the most successful in avoiding false alarms. However, Giacomoni326
et al. (2017) algorithm is less sensitive, resulting in lower TPR and minor timing errors (see327
Figure 4(c)) that led to a score S equal to 0.927. With a value of S equal to 0.896, the328
algorithm proposed by Brentan et al. (2017) can also be regarded as a strong performer. As329
shown in Figure 4(d), this algorithm was able to consistently and accurately detect most of330
the attacks, but it failed to identify the last one.331
332
Although outdistanced by the leading group, the contributions of Chandy et al. (2017)333
and Pasha et al. (2017) are still sensibly better than the naïve detection mechanisms de-334
scribed in the second section. Their score S is equal to 0.802 and 0.773, respectively. As335
illustrated in Figure 4(e,f), these two detection algorithms appear to suffer from opposite336
problems. The algorithm of Chandy et al. (2017) turned out to be over-sensitive—meaning337
that it was able to identify most of the attack instances, but at the cost of issuing numerous338
false alarms. This is reflected on a relatively high value of the TPR, which, however, coin-339
cides with the lowest overall value of the TNR. On the other hand, the algorithm of Pasha340
et al. (2017) issued just a few false alarms, but it lacked sensitivity, thus failing to flag the341
system as under attack for the entire duration of the events. This resulted in a very high342
value of the TNR and the overall lowest TPR. Finally, the contribution of Aghashahi et al.343
(2017) detected only three attacks, leading to a score S equal to 0.534.344
General Observations345
The main insights from the results presented above can be summarized as follows:346
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• All algorithms but one achieved a ranking score S larger than 0.75, meaning that347
they performed better than naïve detection mechanisms. Yet, we observed a large348
variability in the algorithm performance.349
• Both time-to-detection and classification score are important aspects of performance.350
Logically, the algorithms that performed consistently well for both metrics achieved351
a higher ranking score. There appears to be a strong correlation between these two352
metrics for most of the proposed algorithms (see Figure 3).353
• Interestingly, the BATADAL was won by the only model-based approach. The idea354
of estimating the water demands to simulate system dynamics with EPANET, and355
then measure the errors with respect to the SCADA readings, proved successful. In356
this regard, it is important to note that the BATADAL demand patterns were fairly357
regular and consistent across the three datasets. Similarly, the participants were given358
the same computational model of the C-Town network that was used to generate the359
SCADA data (i.e., the input file C-Town.inp). Therefore, successful application of360
this approach in real-world settings might be hindered by various factors, such as361
the intrinsic variability of demand patterns, key uncertainties in the hydraulic model362
(e.g., actual status of each component, pipe roughness, or pump performance curves),363
or the unavailability of a reliable system model.364
• Three data-driven algorithms belong to the cluster of high-performing detection mech-365
anisms. This indicates that both model-based and data-driven approaches may be366
suitable for attack detection problems, although their performance would probably367
vary with the modelling context at hand.368
• Only a few algorithms provided information on the attacked devices. Among these,369
the algorithms proposed by Brentan et al. (2017) and Giacomoni et al. (2017) were370
the most accurate.371
• Most teams presented multi-stage detection methods. Comparing and confirming the372
detection issued by different modules can help decrease classification errors.373
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• Detection algorithms adopting a ‘multivariate’ approach may be best suited than al-374
gorithms analyzing a single time series per time. The inherent interdependence of the375
elements in the water network should theoretically allow for the detection of anoma-376
lies, even when the adversaries try to conceal their actions by altering the SCADA377
readings of one or a few deployed sensors. Note that such interdependence generally378
presents a nonlinear nature, which can be well described by nonlinear models—such379
as those belonging to the class of Artificial Neural Networks.380
• The adoption of supervised classification algorithms that learn how to classify the381
system state (as either safe or under attack) may not be ideal, since the number of382
attacks in the available data is generally limited. Supervised classification algorithms383
should always be combined with cross-validation schemes.384
• It appears that consistency checks and the analysis of control rules should lead to the385
identification of the simplest attacks.386
We note that the results described above were obtained on three specific datasets, which387
represent only a small portion of the entire set of cyber-attacks that could threaten a water388
distribution system. Hence, the generation of different attacks is likely to produce different389
results—a limitation observed in other battles (e.g., Ostfeld et al. (2008)).390
Another factor that influences the BATADAL results relates to the evaluation criteria. First,391
the time-to-detection score STTD is based on the ratio between the time taken to detect an392
attack and the attack duration; this implies that a 2-hour attack detected within 1 hour393
would have the same score as a 10-hour attack detected on hour 5. Some operators may394
prefer to define scores that account explicitly for the absolute value of the attack duration395
or its corresponding damage. Second, the classification performance score SCLF is based on396
TPR and TNR, which are common metrics for classification problems. Yet, one may adopt397
other metrics, such as the F1 score (Sokolova and Lapalme 2009). Third, time-to-detection398
and classification performance score were given the same importance (the coefficient γ is399
equal to 0.50 in Eq. (7)). Depending on the problem at hand, one may want to outweigh400
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the time-to-detection (or the classification accuracy).401
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS402
The BATADAL highlighted the following gaps that may need additional research efforts:403
• Robustness analysis. As mentioned above, the performance of an attack detection404
algorithm may depend—to a certain extent—on the data used during the calibration405
and validation process. To limit the impact of data when evaluating the robustness of406
an algorithm, it is thus advisable to generate stochastic simulation scenarios compris-407
ing varying hydraulic conditions (i.e., water demand, initial tank levels) and multiple408
attack sequences.409
• Use of real SCADA data. A major limitation of the current research on cyber-security410
is the absence of detailed information on cyber attacks to water utilities (e.g., timing,411
compromised devices, hydraulic response of the system). Access to such information412
and to the corresponding SCADA data—perhaps, in some anonymized forms—would413
drastically enhance our understanding on skills and limitations of detection algo-414
rithms. Another challenge with SCADA data is that they often contain noise and415
measurement errors, so attack detection algorithms should be coupled with data pre-416
processing techniques.417
• Pressure deficient conditions and water quality problems. A limitation of this battle418
is its reliance of data generated with a demand-driven engine (Taormina et al. 2017).419
The range of attacks should be thus extended to include pressure-deficient conditions,420
water quality problems, and adversial attempts aimed at threatening emergency re-421
sponses, such as firefighting operations. In the absence of real SCADA data, sim-422
ulated data could be generated by combining epanetCPA with more sophisticated423
hydraulic engines (e.g., Sayyed et al. (2015)) or water quality models (e.g., EPANET-424
MSX, Shang et al. (2007)).425
• Sensitivity analysis. The definition of the cut-off criteria defining outliers regulates426
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the trade-off between TPR and TNR for most of the algorithms, so there is a need427
to adopt or develop sensitivity analysis tools that draw the appropriate line between428
normal and anomalous data (Abokifa et al. 2017). This step should always precede429
the application of an algorithm to new datasets—or its deployment in a SCADA430
system.431
• Computational requirements and scalability to large networks. The algorithms pre-432
sented in this paper were applied to a medium-sized water distribution system com-433
prising one SCADA system and nine PLCs. Since attack detection algorithm are434
meant to run in real-time, it is necessary to evaluate their computational require-435
ments as well as their scalability to larger networks.436
• Attack localization. To facilitate and hasten incident resolution, an ideal detection437
mechanism should be able to identify which components of the network are being438
attacked. This is a rather challenging task due to the intrinsic correlation among the439
hydraulic variables. For data-driven detection mechanisms, the task may be solved440
with variable (or feature) selection algorithms (Galelli et al. 2014; Karakaya et al.441
2016), which identify the variables that are strongly related to the detected anomalies.442
• Integration with other fault detection mechanisms. Since attack detection mechanisms443
aim to disclose outliers and contextual anomalies in the system behavior, they may444
accidentally disclose anomalous behaviors that are not necessarily caused by cyber at-445
tacks (e.g., a water level sensor reporting wrong readings or a malfunctioning pump).446
Hence, there is a need to disclose the nature of each problem being identified—for ex-447
ample, by combining the attack detection algorithms with fault detection mechanisms448
that monitor the operations of PLCs.449
• Cost effectiveness of attack detection. In the BATADAL, the different algorithms were450
evaluated based on their responsiveness and classification performance. Although451
these metrics provide some insights on the potential benefits of deploying an attack452
detection mechanism, a more comprehensive evaluation is needed. For example, one453
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could try to estimate the damage or cost associated to each cyber-physical attack and454
the corresponding cost savings guaranteed by a detection algorithm.455
CLOSURE456
The BATADAL is the first battle competition dealing with the emerging topic of cyber-457
physical security of water distribution systems. This battle gave an opportunity to develop,458
test, and compare attack detection algorithms for SCADA data. The solutions provided by459
seven teams suggest that timely and accurate detection can be obtained by both model-460
based and data-driven approaches, usually made of multiple sequential stages. While the461
data and algorithms presented here provide a first step towards an objective comparison of462
attack detection algorithms for water distribution systems, they do not represent the entire463
spectrum of modelling contexts that practitioners and researchers would encounter. Hence,464
we hope that the availability of a dedicated website (www.batadal.net) will help share more465
datasets and case studies.466
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA467
The supplemental data include the following files, which are available online in the ASCE468
Library (www.ascelibrary.org):469
• BATADAL rules.pdf—competition rules, available to participants;470
• C-Town.inp—EPANET input file, version 2.00.12, available to participants;471
• Training dataset 1.csv—data without attacks, available to participants;472
• Training dataset 2.csv—data with attacks and corresponding labels, available to the473
participants with partial labels;474
• Test dataset.csv—data with attacks and corresponding labels, available to the partic-475
ipants without labels;476
• Detection Reports.zip—detection reports submitted by the participants.477
Additional details about BATADAL are available at www.batadal.net. epanetCPA is avail-478
able at https://github.com/rtaormina/epanetCPA.479
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TABLE 1. Sensors and actuators (pumps, valves) monitored/controlled by the PLCs.
For each PLC, we also report the corresponding controlling sensor, which provides the
information needed to operate the actuators. Note that a PLC-to-PLC connection is
established whenever an actuator and the corresponding control sensor are connected
to two different PLCs.
PLC Sensor Actuators (Controlling sensor)
PLC1 - PU1(T1), PU2(T1)
PLC2 T1 -
PLC3 T2 V2(T2), PU4(T3), PU5(T3), PU6(T4), PU7(T4)
PLC4 T3 -
PLC5 - PU8(T5), PU9(-), PU10(T7), PU11(T7)
PLC6 T4 -
PLC7 T5 -
PLC8 T6 -
PLC9 T7 -
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TABLE 2. Attacks featured in Training dataset 2.
ID Starting time[dd/mm/YY HH]
Ending time
[dd/mm/YY HH]
Duration
[hours] Attack description SCADA concealment
Labeled
[hours]
1 13/09/2016 23 16/09/2016 00 50 Attacker alters SCADA transmission to
PLC9 and changes the L_T7 thresholds
determining when pumps PU10/PU11 are
switched ON/OFF. Low levels in T7.
Replay attack on
L_T7 .
42
2 26/09/2016 11 27/09/2016 10 24 Like Attack #1. Like Attack #1 but re-
play attack extended
on PU10/PU11 flow
and status.
0
3 09/10/2016 09 11/10/2016 20 60 Attack alters L_T1 readings sent by PLC2
to PLC1, which reads a constant low level
and keeps pumps PU1/PU2 ON. Overflow in
T1.
Polyline to offset
L_T1 increase.
60
4 29/10/2016 19 02/11/2016 16 94 Like Attack #3. Replay attack on
L_T1, PU1/PU2 flow
and status, as well as
on pressure at pumps
outlet (P_J269).
37
5 26/11/2016 17 29/11/2016 04 60 Working speed of PU7 reduced to 0.9 of nom-
inal speed. Lower water levels in T4.
7
6 06/12/2016 07 10/12/2016 04 94 Like Attack #5, but speed reduced to 0.7. Replay attack on
L_T4.
73
7 14/12/2016 15 19/12/2016 04 110 Like Attack #6. Replay attack on
L_T4, as well as on
PU6/PU7 flow and
status.
0
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TABLE 3. Attacks featured in the Test dataset.
ID Starting time[dd/mm/YY HH]
Ending time
[dd/mm/YY HH]
Duration
[hours] Attack description SCADA concealment
8 16/01/2017 09 19/01/2017 06 70 Attacker gains control of PLC3 and changes
the L_T3 thresholds determining when
pumps PU4/PU5 are switched ON/OFF.
Low levels in T3.
Replay attack on
L_T3, as well as on
PU4/PU5 flow and
status.
9 30/01/2017 08 02/02/2017 00 65 Attack alters L_T2 readings arriving to
PLC3, which reads a low level and keeps
valve V2 OPEN. The attack leads T2 to over-
flow.
Polyline to offset
L_T2 increase.
10 09/02/2017 03 10/02/2017 09 31 Malicious activation of pump PU3
11 12/02/2017 01 13/02/2017 07 31 Similar to Attack #10
12 24/02/2017 05 28/02/2017 08 100 Similar to Attack #9 Replay attack on
L_T2, V2 flow and
status, as well as on
V2 inlet and outlet
pressure readings
(P_J14, P_J422)
13 10/03/2017 14 13/03/2017 21 80 Attacker gains control of PLC5 and changes
the L_T7 thresholds determining when
pumps PU10/PU11 are switched ON/OFF.
The pumps are forced to switch ON/OFF
continuously during the attack.
Replay attack on
L_T7, PU10/PU11
flow and status, as
well as on pumps inlet
and outlet pressure
readings (P_J14,
P_J422). Inlet pres-
sure concealment
terminates before that
of other variables.
14 25/03/2017 20 27/03/2017 01 30 Alteration of T4 signal arriving to PLC6.
Overflow in T6.
30
TABLE 4. Performance of all attack detection algorithms, assessed in terms of num-
ber of attacks detected, overall ranking score (S), time-to-detection (STTD), accu-
racy (SCLF ), True Positive Ratio (TPR), True Negative Ratio (TNR), and number of
True Positives (TP ), False Positives (FP ), True Negatives (TN) and False Negatives
(FN). The algorithms are ranked according to the their overall ranking score.
Rank Team # Attacks detected S STTD SCLF TPR TNR TP FP TN FN
1 Housh and Ohar 7 0.970 0.965 0.975 0.953 0.997 388 5 1677 19
2 Abokifa et al. 7 0.949 0.958 0.940 0.921 0.959 375 69 1613 32
3 Giacomoni et al. 7 0.927 0.936 0.917 0.838 0.997 341 5 1677 66
4 Brentan et al. 6 0.894 0.857 0.931 0.889 0.973 362 45 1637 45
5 Chandy et al. 7 0.802 0.835 0.768 0.857 0.678 349 541 1141 58
6 Pasha et al. 7 0.773 0.885 0.660 0.329 0.992 134 14 1668 273
7 Aghashahi et al. 3 0.534 0.429 0.640 0.396 0.884 161 195 1487 246
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FIG. 1. Graphical representation of C-Town water distribution system (adapted from
Taormina et al. 2017).
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Attack window
FIG. 2. Illustration of attack #3 (from Training dataset 2). The attacker alters Tank
T1 water level readings (continuous black line) sent by PLC2 to PLC1, which reads
a constant low level (dotted black line) and keeps Pumps PU1/PU2 ON. This causes
an overflow in Tank T1 (thick gray line). To conceal the action, the attacker alters
the signal sent by PLC2 to SCADA (dashed black line) by adding a time-varying
offset (continuous gray line). The duration of the entire attack is highlighted by the
light gray line on the horizontal axis.
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FIG. 3. Graphical representation of the algorithm performance, measured in terms of
time-to-detection (STTD, horizontal axis), classification performance (SCLF , vertical
axis), and overall ranking score (S, color-bar).
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